Keeping the Lights On: Managing the Philippines' Electricity Crisis

The management of its energy supply has been a recurring and critical challenge for the Philippines throughout its modern history. While energy needs grew alongside population and industrialization, infrastructure development and policy often lagged, leading to periods of significant strain and outright Philippines electricity crisis. Among these, the early to mid-1990s stand out as the most severe and widely remembered, characterized by debilitating blackouts Philippines that crippled the economy and disrupted daily life. This era forced a fundamental reevaluation of the nation’s energy sector and spurred urgent, albeit sometimes controversial, solutions. Understanding the historical context of the Philippine energy crisis management requires delving into the factors that led to these shortages, the specific measures implemented by different administrations, and the long-term impact of these policies on the country’s power landscape, including the pivotal Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA).

This article will trace the historical trajectory of managing the Philippines’ electricity crisis, focusing particularly on the critical period of the 1990s, the significant interventions under President Fidel V. Ramos, the subsequent legislative reforms like EPIRA, and the ongoing efforts to ensure a stable, affordable, and sustainable energy future. We will examine the roles of key institutions such as the National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) (and its successor, the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) in navigating these challenges.

The Seeds of the Crisis: Pre-1990s Energy Landscape

Before the acute crisis of the 1990s, the Philippines’ power sector was largely dominated by the state-owned National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor). Established in 1936, NPC held a monopoly over power generation and transmission across the archipelago. While significant infrastructure projects, including large hydropower and geothermal plants, were undertaken, particularly during the Martial Law era under President Ferdinand Marcos, these developments faced challenges. Issues included:

Underinvestment: Insufficient capital was allocated for timely maintenance, upgrades, and expansion of aging power plants and transmission lines.
Centralization and Bureaucracy: Decision-making processes within NPC and the government could be slow and subject to political considerations, hindering agile responses to growing demand.
Reliance on Imported Fuels: A heavy dependence on imported oil for thermal power plants made the country vulnerable to volatile global oil prices.
Demand Growth: Rapid urbanization and industrialization, especially in Luzon, outpaced the rate of new capacity additions.

While brownouts and localized power issues were not unheard of in the 1970s and 1980s, the system had enough reserve margin, albeit dwindling, to generally meet the baseline demand. However, the underlying vulnerabilities were accumulating.

The Crisis Deepens: The Early 1990s Blackouts

The situation escalated dramatically in the early 1990s under the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino. Several factors converged to create a perfect storm that led to widespread and prolonged power outages Philippines:

Aging Power Plants: Many of NPC’s thermal power plants were old, inefficient, and frequently breaking down due to lack of maintenance and spare parts.
Lack of New Capacity: There was a significant lag in commissioning new power generation facilities. Projects planned earlier were delayed or canceled due to funding issues, environmental concerns, or political opposition.
Increased Demand: Economic recovery and growth post-EDSA Revolution, though modest initially, still put additional strain on the grid.
Environmental Factors: The El Niño phenomenon in the early 1990s led to reduced water levels in major hydropower dams, significantly cutting their generation output.
Policy Uncertainty: The post-Marcos transition brought about policy reviews and changes that sometimes slowed down critical energy sector investments.

The result was a severe shortage of reliable generating capacity. By 1992 and 1993, Luzon, the country’s industrial and political heartland, experienced daily rotating blackouts Philippines lasting 8 to 12 hours, sometimes even longer. Businesses were forced to cut operating hours or invest in expensive private generators, significantly increasing costs. Foreign investors became hesitant to set up operations in a country unable to guarantee basic power supply. Daily life was severely disrupted, affecting everything from traffic lights and water pumps to household activities and communication. The crisis became a symbol of the government’s perceived inability to deliver essential services and became a major political liability. This period clearly demonstrated the critical need for effective Philippine energy crisis management.

The Ramos Administration’s Decisive Response (1992-1998)

Upon assuming office in 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos immediately recognized the severity of the Philippines electricity crisis and made its resolution a top priority of his administration. He famously declared that solving the power crisis was non-negotiable and essential for national recovery and growth. His administration adopted a multi-pronged and aggressive approach, characterized by urgency and leveraging private sector participation.

The cornerstone of the Ramos administration’s strategy was the passage of Republic Act No. 7648, or the Electric Power Crisis Act, in 1993. This landmark legislation granted the President special emergency powers to address the crisis. Key provisions and actions included:

Fast-Tracking Power Projects: The Act streamlined the processes for approving and implementing new power generation projects, cutting through red tape that had previously caused delays.
Incentivizing Private Sector Participation: Recognizing that NPC lacked the resources and speed to build the necessary plants quickly, the government actively sought private investment in power generation. This led to the widespread adoption of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme (and its variants like Build-Own-Operate – BOO). Under BOT contracts, private companies (known as independent power producers (IPPs)) would finance, build, and operate power plants for a specified period (typically 15-25 years) before transferring ownership to the government (or PSALM later on). The government, through NPC, guaranteed the purchase of the power generated by these IPPs through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).
Emergency Power Projects: Short-term, fast-deployment power barges and modular power plants were rapidly contracted and installed to provide immediate additional capacity, particularly in Luzon. These were often diesel-fired and more expensive to run but provided crucial stop-gap relief.
Rehabilitation of Existing Plants: Efforts were made to rehabilitate and improve the efficiency of existing NPC power plants.
Demand-Side Management: Campaigns were launched to encourage energy conservation among consumers.

The adoption of the BOT scheme and the influx of independent power producers (IPPs) were the most significant and visible aspects of the Ramos response. Companies like Hopewell Holdings (Hong Kong), Enron (USA), and others entered the Philippine market, rapidly constructing new power plants, primarily fueled by bunker fuel and diesel initially, with later shifts to natural gas (like the Malampaya project). Within a few years, substantial new capacity was added to the grid.

By 1994-1995, the debilitating daily blackouts Philippines had largely been eliminated in Luzon. The increased power supply fueled economic recovery and restored business confidence. The immediate objective of ending the crisis was successfully achieved, showcasing effective crisis management under pressure.

However, the rapid nature of the solutions, particularly the terms of the PPAs with IPPs, led to significant long-term challenges.

Long-Term Consequences of the Ramos Solution

While effective in resolving the immediate Philippines electricity crisis, the heavy reliance on BOT contracts and IPPs had unintended consequences:

High Power Costs: The PPAs with IPPs often contained “take-or-pay” clauses, meaning NPC had to pay for the contracted capacity whether it was used or not. This, combined with the guaranteed rates negotiated during a period of urgency, resulted in high generation costs that were passed on to consumers. The emergency projects, being more expensive to run, also contributed to high electricity bills.
NPC’s Financial Burden: NPC’s financial health deteriorated significantly under the weight of these expensive contracts and its operational inefficiencies. It accumulated massive debts.
Fragmented Structure: While new generation capacity was added, the overall structure of the power sector remained largely centralized under NPC for transmission and distribution (though private distribution utilities existed, like Meralco). There was limited competition in generation.
Environmental Concerns: The rapid deployment of fossil-fuel-based plants raised environmental concerns.

These issues highlighted the need for more fundamental, structural reforms in the Philippine power sector beyond simply adding capacity.

Structural Reforms: The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA)

The lessons learned from the 1990s crisis and its aftermath paved the way for the passage of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) (Republic Act No. 9136) in June 2001, during the short-lived administration of President Joseph Estrada and subsequently implemented under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. EPIRA represents the most significant piece of legislation aimed at restructuring the Philippine power sector and forms a core component of the ongoing Philippine energy crisis management efforts.

The primary goals of EPIRA were:

Restructuring the Industry: To unbundle the different sectors of the power industry (generation, transmission, distribution, and supply) to promote competition and efficiency.
Privatization: To privatize NPC’s generation assets and eventually the transmission network.
Establishing a Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM): To create a transparent and competitive market for the trading of electricity.
Encouraging Competition: To encourage private sector participation and competition in generation and supply.
Protecting Consumer Interests: To ensure the quality, reliability, security, and affordability of electric power.
Creating Regulatory Bodies: To strengthen and clarify the roles of regulatory bodies like the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), which replaced the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).

Key Components and Entities under EPIRA

National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor): Its generation assets were to be privatized. It retains ownership of certain strategic assets (like watershed areas) and is involved in missionary electrification in off-grid areas.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM): Created under EPIRA to manage the sale of NPC’s generation assets and the independent power producer (IPP) contracts, as well as to liquidate NPC’s financial obligations. Managing the stranded costs and debts from the IPP contracts signed post-crisis is a key function of PSALM.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP): A private consortium that won the concession to operate and maintain the national transmission grid from NPC.
Generation Companies (GenCos): Private companies operating power plants, including former NPC plants and those owned by independent power producers (IPPs). This sector was fully liberalized.
Distribution Utilities (DUs): Companies (like Meralco) or cooperatives that distribute electricity to end-users in their franchise areas.
Retail Electricity Suppliers (RES): Companies authorized to sell electricity directly to contestable customers (large users given the choice of supplier).
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC): The independent regulatory body responsible for setting rates for transmission and distribution, promoting competition, and protecting consumer interests. It inherited and expanded the functions of the earlier Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Department of Energy (DOE): The government agency responsible for overall energy policy Philippines, planning, and supervision of the energy sector.

EPIRA’s Impact and Challenges

EPIRA brought about significant changes to the power sector structure. Many of NPC’s plants were successfully privatized, and the transmission grid was concessioned out. The WESM was established, intended to provide a transparent price discovery mechanism.

However, the implementation of EPIRA has faced numerous challenges and criticisms:

Privatization Pace: The privatization of NPC’s assets, particularly the large hydro plants, has been slower than initially envisioned.
Market Concentration: Concerns persist about potential market power and concentration in the generation sector, limiting genuine competition in some areas.
High Electricity Prices: Despite the goal of reducing costs through competition, the Philippines still has some of the highest electricity rates in Southeast Asia. Factors include generation costs (influenced by fuel prices and legacy IPP contracts managed by PSALM), transmission costs, distribution costs, and various taxes and universal charges mandated by EPIRA.
Stranded Costs and Debts: Managing NPC’s historical debts and the costs associated with the expensive IPP contracts continues to be a burden managed by PSALM, reflected in consumer electricity bills through the Universal Charge for Stranded Contract Costs.
Regulatory Effectiveness: The effectiveness and independence of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) have been subject to scrutiny and debate.
Reliability and Security: While the blackouts of the 90s were largely resolved, concerns about grid stability, transmission bottlenecks, and the need for sufficient reserve power remain pertinent to Philippine energy crisis management.

Despite these challenges, EPIRA fundamentally altered the landscape, moving away from a state monopoly towards a more market-oriented structure. The debates around its effectiveness continue, prompting ongoing discussions about potential amendments or alternative approaches to energy sector reforms Philippines.

Subsequent Administrations and Ongoing Energy Management

Managing the Philippines’ energy needs remains a complex task for every succeeding administration post-Ramos. While the acute daily blackouts of the 90s are no longer the norm in major grids, challenges persist, requiring continuous Philippine energy crisis management.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010): Presided over the initial implementation of EPIRA, the establishment of PSALM and the ERC, and the concession of the transmission grid. Faced challenges related to high global oil prices and the ongoing issue of stranded costs.
President Benigno S. Aquino III (2010-2016): Continued the privatization efforts and focused on attracting investments in generation. Faced power supply issues, particularly in Mindanao, leading to brownouts in that region. Promoted renewable energy but faced hurdles in implementation.
President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022): Emphasized the need for energy security and affordability. Pushed for energy efficiency measures and continued efforts to streamline permitting for energy projects. Also saw debates over the long-term energy mix, including discussions about nuclear power.
President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. (2022-Present): Inherited challenges including rising global fuel costs, grid stability concerns, and the need to integrate more renewable energy while ensuring baseload power. The administration is exploring various options, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a transition fuel and potentially reviving interest in nuclear energy, alongside boosting renewable capacity.

Common threads in the Philippine energy crisis management efforts across these administrations include:

Attracting Investment: Continuous efforts to encourage private sector investment in power generation and infrastructure.
Diversifying the Energy Mix: Pushing for a move away from heavy reliance on coal towards cleaner sources, including natural gas and renewables (solar, wind, geothermal, hydro). This is a crucial aspect of long-term energy security and sustainability.
Improving Transmission and Distribution: Recognizing the need to upgrade and expand the grid to handle increasing demand and the integration of variable renewable energy sources.
Addressing Regulatory Hurdles: Ongoing attempts to simplify permitting processes and improve regulatory predictability overseen by the DOE and ERC.
Ensuring Energy Access: Continuing missionary electrification programs to bring power to remote and off-grid communities, often still managed by NPC/Napocor.

Despite the progress since the 1990s crisis, the Philippines’ energy sector faces future challenges. These include managing the energy transition away from fossil fuels, ensuring grid resilience against natural disasters, addressing the financial health of sector players (including PSALM‘s remaining obligations), and ultimately, delivering affordable and reliable power to all Filipinos. The historical experience of managing the Philippines’ electricity crisis, particularly the lessons from the rapid build-out under Ramos and the structural reforms under EPIRA, continue to inform current energy policy Philippines and future strategies.

Key Events Timeline in Philippine Electricity Management

To better understand the historical progression, here is a simplified timeline of key events related to the Philippines electricity crisis and its management:

1936: National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor) created.
1970s-1980s: Development of major power projects under NPC, including geothermal and hydro. Underlying issues of underinvestment begin to emerge.
Early 1990s (Aquino Administration): Severe power shortages and prolonged blackouts Philippines cripple Luzon and other areas.
1993 (Ramos Administration): Electric Power Crisis Act (RA 7648) passed, granting emergency powers. Aggressive promotion of build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme and contracting with independent power producers (IPPs).
Mid-1990s: Significant new power generation capacity added, ending the acute blackout crisis.
Late 1990s: Consequences of expensive IPP contracts burden NPC/Napocor financially, leading to high power costs.
June 2001 (Estrada/Arroyo Administrations): Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) (RA 9136) is enacted, aiming for restructuring and privatization.
2001 onwards: PSALM is created to manage NPC’s assets and liabilities. The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) replaces the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). Efforts to privatize NPC assets and establish WESM begin.
2009: The concession for the national transmission grid is awarded to the privately-led National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP).
2010s-Present: Ongoing efforts to manage the power sector under EPIRA, address market issues, promote renewable energy, manage PSALM‘s liabilities, and ensure grid reliability. Debates on energy policy Philippines continue regarding energy mix, sustainability, and affordability.

Period	Administration(s)	Key Challenge(s)	Major Management Strategy/Policy	Outcomes/Impact
Pre-1990s	Various (esp. Martial Law)	Underinvestment, centralisation	NPC-led development of state-owned power plants	Growing capacity but insufficient maintenance and slow reaction to demand growth.
Early 1990s	Corazon C. Aquino	Severe capacity shortage, aging plants	Limited new capacity additions	Crippling, prolonged blackouts Philippines, economic disruption.
1992-1998	Fidel V. Ramos	Acute power crisis	Electric Power Crisis Act, BOT scheme, contract with IPPs	Rapidly ended blackouts; led to high power costs and NPC debt.
2001-Present	Estrada, Arroyo, Aquino III, etc.	Structural issues, high costs, debt	Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) (RA 9136), Privatization, WESM, creation of PSALM and ERC	Restructured industry, increased private participation, ongoing challenges with costs, regulation, and market structure.

Export to Sheets

This table highlights the shift from state-led development to crisis response involving the private sector, and then to structural reform aimed at market liberalization.

The Roles of Key Institutions

Several government and quasi-government entities have played crucial roles in the historical and ongoing Philippine energy crisis management:

Department of Energy (DOE): As the primary policymaking body, the DOE is responsible for crafting the overall energy policy Philippines, including sector plans, energy security strategies, and promoting different energy sources. It sets the direction for energy development.
National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor): Historically the dominant player, NPC/Napocor now primarily focuses on operating strategic power plants (like large hydro), managing missionary electrification in off-grid areas, and providing ancillary services to the grid. Its past role as a monopoly generator and transmitter is central to understanding the lead-up to EPIRA.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM): A temporary government entity created by EPIRA to manage the privatization of NPC/Napocor‘s assets and the administration of the legacy independent power producer (IPP) contracts. Its task of liquidating NPC/Napocor‘s significant financial obligations, including those stemming from the crisis-era BOT contracts, has been a long and challenging process, impacting consumer electricity rates through universal charges.
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC): The independent regulator of the power industry, the ERC approves power purchase agreements, sets transmission and distribution rates, monitors market compliance, and protects consumer welfare. It replaced the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under EPIRA, with expanded powers. The effectiveness and independence of the ERC are crucial for ensuring fair competition and reasonable prices in the liberalized market.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP): Though privately run under a concession agreement, NGCP operates and maintains the national transmission network, a critical backbone for power delivery. Its performance in upgrading the grid and ensuring reliable transmission is vital for preventing localized or system-wide outages.

The interplay between these entities, guided by the prevailing energy policy Philippines and the framework established by EPIRA, defines the current approach to managing the nation’s energy sector and preventing a recurrence of a severe Philippines electricity crisis.

Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges

The history of managing the Philippines’ electricity crisis is a story of urgent response to a critical national challenge, followed by ambitious but complex structural reforms. The severe blackouts Philippines of the early 1990s highlighted the dangers of underinvestment and bureaucratic inertia in critical infrastructure. The decisive, though costly, actions taken by the Fidel V. Ramos administration, leveraging the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme and independent power producers (IPPs), successfully ended the immediate crisis but created legacy financial burdens for NPC/Napocor and higher costs for consumers.

The subsequent passage of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) marked a fundamental shift towards a market-oriented power sector, aiming to foster competition, attract private investment, and improve efficiency through privatization and regulatory oversight by entities like PSALM and the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) (formerly Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)). While EPIRA has led to increased private participation and structural changes, it has not been without its challenges, particularly concerning electricity prices, market concentration, and the ongoing management of legacy debts.

Today, Philippine energy crisis management involves navigating a complex landscape shaped by these historical events and policies. The challenges have evolved from simply having enough power to ensuring it is affordable, reliable, and increasingly sourced from sustainable origins. The DOE continues to develop energy policy Philippines aimed at diversifying the energy mix, attracting investment in cleaner technologies, and improving grid infrastructure operated by NGCP.

The historical experience underscores the vital importance of proactive planning, timely investment in infrastructure, clear and stable regulatory frameworks, and a balanced approach that considers both short-term needs and long-term sustainability in energy sector reforms Philippines. As the country’s energy demand continues to grow, the lessons from past crises remain invaluable in guiding future efforts to secure the nation’s power future.

Key Takeaways:

The early 1990s saw a severe Philippines electricity crisis with prolonged blackouts Philippines due to underinvestment and aging infrastructure.
President Fidel V. Ramos‘s administration resolved the immediate crisis through emergency powers, the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme, and engaging independent power producers (IPPs).
This rapid solution, while ending blackouts, led to expensive power purchase agreements and significant debt for NPC/Napocor.
The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001 aimed to restructure the sector through privatization, competition, and establishing bodies like PSALM and ERC (replacing ERB).
EPIRA has brought structural changes but faces ongoing challenges with high costs, market issues, and managing legacy obligations.
Current Philippine energy crisis management involves diversifying the energy mix, upgrading the grid (managed by NGCP), attracting investment, and refining energy policy Philippines through the DOE.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ):

Q: What caused the severe blackouts in the Philippines in the early 1990s? A: The crisis was primarily caused by a combination of factors: aging and poorly maintained power plants of the National Power Corporation (NPC/Napocor), lack of new generation capacity additions, increased demand from economic growth, and environmental factors like El Niño affecting hydropower output.

Q: How did President Fidel V. Ramos’s administration solve the power crisis? A: The Ramos administration addressed the crisis by passing the Electric Power Crisis Act, which granted emergency powers to fast-track power projects. They heavily utilized the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme to quickly attract independent power producers (IPPs) who built new power plants, rapidly increasing the available generation capacity.

Q: What is the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA)? A: EPIRA is a landmark law enacted in 2001 that aimed to restructure the Philippine power sector. Its main goals include unbundling the industry, privatizing NPC/Napocor‘s assets, establishing a competitive market, and strengthening regulation through bodies like the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).

Q: What were the main criticisms or negative consequences of the solutions implemented in the 1990s? A: While effective in ending the blackouts, the emergency measures and BOT contracts with IPPs often included expensive “take-or-pay” clauses and guaranteed rates. This led to high generation costs, burdened NPC/Napocor with significant debt (now managed by PSALM), and contributed to high electricity prices in the long term.

Q: What role does PSALM play in the Philippine energy sector today? A: PSALM (Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation) was created under EPIRA to manage the privatization of NPC/Napocor‘s assets and the administration of legacy independent power producer (IPP) contracts. Its primary function is to liquidate NPC/Napocor‘s financial obligations, which involves managing debt and assets, impacting consumer electricity bills through universal charges.

Q: How has EPIRA changed the power industry structure? A: EPIRA unbundled the industry into distinct sectors: generation, transmission (now operated by NGCP), distribution, and supply. It introduced competition in generation and supply for large consumers and created independent regulatory bodies like the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to oversee the market.

Sources:

Hill, Hal. “The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.” Oxford University Press, 2002. (Provides context on economic development and infrastructure challenges).
Constantino, Renato. “The Nationalist Alternative.” Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1979. (Historical context on industrialization and state role). – Note: While Constantino provides broader historical context, specific details on the power sector crisis would require other sources.
David, Cristina C., and Arsenio M. Balisacan. “The Philippine Economy: Development Paths and Policy Issues.” Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006. (Includes analysis of economic reforms and infrastructure).
Manasan, Rosario G. “Power Sector Reform in the Philippines: Accomplishments and Remaining Challenges.” Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) Discussion Paper Series, 2002. (Provides detailed analysis of EPIRA). [Link: https://www.google.com/search?q=https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/pidspd02-09.pdf – Check for availability]
Cabalu, Helen. “Power Sector Reform in the Philippines.” Energy Policy 31, no. 12 (2003): 1215-1225. (Academic analysis of the reforms).
DOE – Department of Energy Philippines Official Website. (For current energy policy Philippines and data). [Link: https://www.doe.gov.ph/ – Check for availability]
ERC – Energy Regulatory Commission Philippines Official Website. (For regulatory information). [Link: https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.erc.gov.ph/ – Check for availability]
PSALM – Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation Official Website. (For information on privatization and liabilities). [Link: https://www.psalm.gov.ph/ – Check for availability]
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. (For text of RA 7648 and RA 9136). [Link: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/ – Check for availability and specific laws]

(Note: Specific page numbers or direct quotes are not provided as this article is synthesized from general historical knowledge. The provided sources are foundational texts and relevant institutions for further research on the topic of Managing the Philippines’ Electricity Crisis).

Category: Contemporary Period (1986-Present)