History of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

The History of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is deeply interwoven with the complex and protracted Moro conflict in Mindanao, southern Philippines. As one of the most significant non-state armed actors in the country’s modern history, the MILF’s journey reflects the aspirations, struggles, and evolving dynamics of the Moro people’s quest for self-determination and justice. This article delves into the origins, evolution, armed struggle, and eventual transformation of the MILF, charting its path from a splinter group to a key partner in establishing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Understanding the MILF’s history is crucial for grasping the nuances of the ongoing peace process and the future of the Bangsamoro.

Roots of the Moro Conflict: A Brief Background

The Moro conflict is one of Asia’s longest-running internal conflicts, stemming from centuries of resistance by the Moro people (various indigenous Muslim groups in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan) against external rule – initially Spanish and American colonization, and later, perceived marginalization and dispossession by the Philippine state.

Pre-colonial Era: Independent Sultanates (Sulu, Maguindanao, Lanao) existed with established political and social systems.
Spanish Colonial Period: Despite persistent attempts, the Spanish failed to fully subdue the Moro sultanates, leading to prolonged resistance often framed in religious terms.
American Colonial Period: The Americans implemented policies aimed at integration and control, including the arrival of Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas into Mindanao. This marked the beginning of significant demographic shifts that would later contribute to land disputes and social tensions.
Post-Independence Policies: Following Philippine independence in 1946, government policies regarding land ownership, settlement programs, and political representation were often seen by the Moro people as favoring Christian migrants and undermining their ancestral rights and cultural identity. This led to a growing sense of marginalization, economic disenfranchisement, and political powerlessness.

Tensions escalated significantly in the 1960s. Discrimination, land grabbing, and violence against Moro communities fostered a climate of distrust and grievance. These historical injustices formed the bedrock upon which modern Moro nationalism and armed resistance would build.

The Emergence of Moro Nationalism and Armed Struggle

The simmering discontent erupted into open conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A pivotal event was the Jabidah Massacre in March 1968, where dozens of Moro trainees of the Philippine military were allegedly killed. This incident served as a catalyst, unifying various Moro groups and igniting widespread anger and a desire for armed defense and political assertion.

Inspired by rising nationalist movements globally and the specific grievances at home, young Moro intellectuals and activists, many educated in the Middle East, began organizing. This led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) around 1972, under the leadership of Nur Misuari. The MNLF articulated the Moro people’s right to self-determination and initially advocated for outright separatism – the establishment of an independent Moro Republic.

The declaration of Martial Law by President Ferdinand Marcos regime in 1972 further intensified the conflict. The MNLF launched a full-scale insurgency against the GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines), leading to heavy fighting, displacement, and casualties in Mindanao. The conflict gained international attention, particularly from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), which played a crucial mediating role.

Key events during this period include:

Formation of the MNLF (circa 1972): United various Moro fronts under Misuari’s leadership.
Major military offensives: The MNLF gained significant ground in the early 1970s.
OIC Intervention: The OIC recognized the Moro cause and pressured the Philippine government to negotiate.
Tripoli Agreement (1976): Brokered by Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, this agreement between the GRP and MNLF proposed autonomy for 13 provinces in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. However, disagreements over its interpretation and implementation quickly arose, leading to its collapse and renewed fighting.

While the Tripoli Agreement offered a path towards autonomy, it ultimately failed to satisfy key factions within the Moro movement and the GRP, highlighting the deep divide and distrust that characterized the conflict.

The Split: Birth of the MILF

The failure of the Tripoli Agreement and growing internal dissent within the MNLF leadership provided the fertile ground for a split. Several factors contributed to this schism:

Disagreements over the Tripoli Agreement: Some factions felt Misuari compromised too much on the goal of separatism by accepting autonomy within the Philippine state framework.
Ideological Differences: A significant group, led by Hashim Salamat, a religious scholar and former MNLF vice-chairman, advocated for a more explicitly Islamic-oriented struggle and viewed Misuari’s leadership as too secular and centralized. Salamat emphasized the importance of Islamic principles in guiding the movement and the future Bangsamoro entity.
Leadership Style: Criticisms arose regarding Nur Misuari’s leadership style and decision-making processes.

By the late 1970s, these disagreements culminated in the formal split. Hashim Salamat and his followers formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977, initially operating as a distinct faction within the broader Moro resistance but later solidifying as a separate organization. While both groups sought self-determination for the Moro people, the MILF’s ideology was more overtly rooted in Islam, and its long-term goal remained closer to outright independence or a federal arrangement with substantial self-governance, distinct from the MNLF’s evolving position which eventually settled for limited autonomy within the existing Philippine system.

The MILF Under Hashim Salamat: Early Years and Growth

Under the leadership of Hashim Salamat, the MILF rapidly grew, attracting disillusioned MNLF fighters and new recruits drawn to its more purist Islamic ideology and unwavering commitment to a distinct Bangsamoro identity rooted in faith. Salamat, based primarily in Pakistan and later Afghanistan during the initial years, provided ideological guidance while key commanders like Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim (who would later become chairman) built the organization’s military and political structure on the ground in Mindanao.

The MILF established strongholds in central Mindanao, particularly in areas with significant Maguindanao and Iranun populations. They focused on:

Building a strong military force: The Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) became the MILF’s armed wing, engaging in skirmishes and major battles with the GRP military.
Establishing community support: The MILF gained traction by providing services and administering justice in areas under its influence, often filling governance vacuums left by the state.
Developing its political structure: The MILF created political bodies and institutions to govern its affairs and articulate its demands.
Refining its ideology: While initially advocating for independence, the MILF’s political objective evolved over time, eventually focusing on achieving genuine autonomy and self-governance through a political settlement, though the ideal of an independent state remained a potent undercurrent for some members. The shift was influenced by changing regional and international dynamics, as well as the realities of prolonged conflict.

Unlike the MNLF which engaged in peace talks with the Marcos regime under OIC mediation, the MILF remained largely outside formal negotiations for a period, focusing on strengthening its organization and military capability. They viewed the Tripoli Agreement as a failure and were wary of similar compromises.

Escalating Conflict: MILF vs. GRP

The 1990s saw the MILF emerge as the dominant armed Moro group, surpassing the MNLF in terms of manpower and military capability after the MNLF signed a final peace agreement with the Ramos administration in 1996. Despite the peace deal with the MNLF, the Moro conflict continued unabated, primarily between the GRP and the MILF.

Major military campaigns and clashes characterized this period:

Ongoing skirmishes and encounters: The MILF and GRP forces frequently clashed in central and western Mindanao.
“All-Out War” Policy under Estrada: In 2000, President Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out war” against the MILF, launching a massive military offensive that captured several MILF camps, including their main base, Camp Abubakar. While a significant military victory for the GRP, this campaign led to massive displacement of civilians and a humanitarian crisis, further fueling resentment among the Moro population.
Humanitarian Crisis: The displacement caused by military operations highlighted the severe impact of the conflict on civilians, leading to calls for a return to peace talks.
OIC and International Role: The OIC continued to play a role in urging the GRP and MILF to negotiate, often facilitating informal contacts and discussions. Malaysia emerged as a key mediator in facilitating subsequent peace talks.

The “all-out war” demonstrated the GRP’s military strength but also the MILF’s resilience and ability to regenerate. It underscored the fact that a purely military solution to the Moro conflict was unlikely and that a political settlement was necessary.

Seeking Peace: Early Peace Initiatives

Despite the intermittent fighting, there were attempts to engage the MILF in peace negotiations even before the “all-out war.”

Ramos Administration: While prioritizing the peace talks with the MNLF, President Fidel V. Ramos administration also initiated preliminary contacts with the MILF, recognizing them as a significant player in the conflict. These early talks were often informal and did not lead to substantive agreements.
Estrada Administration: Before the declaration of “all-out war,” the Estrada administration also engaged in peace talks with the MILF. A ceasefire agreement was signed in 1999, but it was fragile and ultimately collapsed, leading to the 2000 offensive.

These early attempts, though unsuccessful in achieving a lasting peace, laid some groundwork for future negotiations. They highlighted the key sticking points: the MILF’s demand for substantial autonomy or self-governance, control over resources, ancestral domain recognition, and the decommissioning of forces. The GRP, on the other hand, sought to maintain territorial integrity and address the conflict within the framework of the Philippine constitution.

The Peace Process Under Arroyo and Beyond

Following the “all-out war” and the subsequent change in GRP leadership, the peace process with the MILF gained renewed momentum under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration. Malaysia formally took on the role of facilitator.

Ceasefires and Peace Talks: Negotiators from the GRP and MILF engaged in numerous rounds of talks, often held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. These talks aimed to address the root causes of the conflict and find a mutually acceptable political solution. Fragile ceasefires were often in place, though violations by both sides and spoiler groups frequently occurred.
The Ancestral Domain Issue: A major focus of the negotiations was the concept of ancestral domain, recognizing the historical rights of the Moro people to their traditional territories.
Aborted Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD): In 2008, the GRP and MILF initialed a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This draft agreement proposed the creation of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) with significant powers of self-governance. However, the MOA-AD faced strong legal and political opposition within the Philippines, particularly from local government units and Christian communities who felt excluded from the process and feared the implications of the agreement. The Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional, leading to the collapse of the peace talks and renewed, intense fighting. This episode significantly damaged trust between the parties and highlighted the need for a more inclusive and constitutionally sound approach to the peace process.

The collapse of the MOA-AD was a major setback, resulting in one of the most violent periods of the conflict in years. It underscored the challenges of achieving peace, requiring not just agreement between the negotiating panels but also broader political consensus and public support.

Towards a Political Solution: The Aquino Administration and the CAB

Recognizing the need to revive the peace process after the MOA-AD debacle, the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III made resolving the Moro conflict a priority. Building on lessons learned from past failures, the Aquino administration and the MILF embarked on a renewed and sustained effort towards a political settlement.

Renewed Negotiations: Peace talks resumed, with Malaysia continuing its facilitating role. Both sides committed to finding a solution within the framework of the Philippine constitution, albeit pushing the boundaries of what autonomy could entail.
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB): After years of painstaking negotiations, the GRP and MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in October 2012. The FAB was a roadmap agreement that outlined the principles and mechanisms for establishing a new autonomous political entity to replace the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was widely seen as a failure. Key features of the FAB included the creation of a new entity called the Bangsamoro, a power-sharing arrangement, wealth-sharing mechanisms, normalization process (including decommissioning of MILF forces), and transitional justice.
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB): Building upon the FAB, the parties signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014. The CAB consolidated all prior agreements and annexes (on transitional arrangements, revenue generation and wealth sharing, power sharing, and normalization) into a single document. It provided a more detailed blueprint for the establishment and functioning of the Bangsamoro political entity. The signing of the CAB was hailed as a historic milestone and a crucial step towards ending decades of conflict.

The Aquino administration and the MILF demonstrated significant political will and flexibility to reach the CAB. The process was complex, involving numerous stakeholders and addressing deeply entrenched issues of governance, resources, and identity. The FAB and CAB became the foundation for drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), the legislative measure needed to implement the agreements.

Challenges to Peace and Implementation

Despite the signing of the CAB, the path to implementing the agreement and establishing the Bangsamoro was fraught with challenges.

Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) Hurdles: The crafting and passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) proved to be a significant challenge. The proposed BBL aimed to create the Bangsamoro political entity with enhanced autonomy. However, it faced intense scrutiny and debate in the Philippine Congress. Concerns were raised about its constitutionality, the extent of powers granted to the Bangsamoro government, and the implications for national sovereignty. Lobbying efforts by various groups, including those opposed to the peace deal, further complicated the legislative process.
Mamasapano Clash (January 2015): A major setback occurred with the Mamasapano clash, where 44 police commandos, 18 MILF fighters, and several civilians were killed during a botched police operation to capture a high-profile terrorist in an MILF-controlled area. This incident sparked public outrage, severely eroded trust in the peace process, and stalled the passage of the BBL in Congress. The Mamasapano clash highlighted the complexities of coordinating security operations in conflict-affected areas and the persistent presence of other armed groups and security threats in Mindanao.
Internal Divisions: While the MILF leadership remained committed to the peace process, there were challenges in ensuring unity within the organization and gaining full buy-in from all commanders and fighters. The normalization process, particularly the decommissioning of forces, presented significant logistical and trust-building hurdles.
Other Armed Groups: The presence of other armed groups in Mindanao, including factions that split from the MILF or MNLF and groups linked to extremist ideologies like the Islamic State (ISIS) influence, posed ongoing security threats and complicated the peace process. These groups often sought to disrupt the path to peace through attacks and violence.

The period following the CAB signing was a critical test for the commitment of both the GRP and the MILF to peace. The Mamasapano clash nearly derailed the entire process, demonstrating the fragility of peace in a region scarred by decades of conflict.

The Duterte Administration and the BARMM

The election of President Rodrigo Duterte administration in 2016 brought new dynamics to the peace process. Duterte, a native of Mindanao, had a strong understanding of the region’s complexities and expressed a commitment to resolving the conflict.

Resumption of BBL Push: The Duterte administration revived the push for the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). After further revisions and deliberations in Congress, the BBL, renamed the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BOL), was finally passed in July 2018.
Creation of BARMM: Following the ratification of the BOL in a plebiscite in January and February 2019, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was officially established, replacing the ARMM. The BARMM represents a significant step towards realizing the aspirations for genuine autonomy and self-governance for the Bangsamoro people, as envisioned in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).
MILF’s Role in Governance: As part of the transition process outlined in the peace agreement, the MILF, through its political party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), assumed leadership of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the interim governing body of the BARMM. Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim, the MILF chairman, was appointed Interim Chief Minister. This marked a historic transition for the MILF from being an armed insurgent group to becoming a partner in governance.

The establishment of the BARMM under the Duterte administration was a culmination of decades of struggle and negotiation. It represents the operationalization of the peace agreement, offering a framework for political settlement, normalization, and development in the region.

MILF’s Transformation: From Armed Group to Governance Partner

The journey from an armed group waging insurgency to a key player in regional governance is a transformative one for the MILF. This transition involves multiple complex processes:

Decommissioning of Forces: A crucial component of the normalization process is the decommissioning of MILF fighters and weapons. This involves putting their arms beyond use in a credible and verifiable manner. The decommissioning process is symbolic of the MILF’s commitment to the peace process and its transition to a non-armed movement. This is a sensitive and challenging process, requiring trust, resources, and international monitoring.
Integration and Reintegration: Former MILF combatants and their communities are being assisted through various programs aimed at their integration into mainstream society. This includes providing livelihood opportunities, education, and psychosocial support.
Political Participation: The MILF is actively participating in the political process through the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). This involves learning the intricacies of governance, administration, and public service.
Addressing Remaining Grievances: While the BARMM addresses many historical grievances, challenges remain, including ancestral domain issues, transitional justice for victims of the conflict, and economic development. The MILF, now within the governance structure, is tasked with addressing these issues through institutional means.

This transformation is not without its difficulties. The MILF leadership faces the challenge of managing expectations within their ranks and the broader Bangsamoro population, while navigating the complexities of governance within the Philippine political system. Maintaining cohesion and ensuring the successful implementation of the peace agreement are ongoing tasks.

Current Status and Future Prospects

As of late 2024 and early 2025, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is in a critical phase of transition. The MILF, as the leading force in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), is steering the region towards its first regular elections, which have been postponed to 2025 to allow more time for the transition process, including the passage of key codes like the Bangsamoro Electoral Code.

BARMM Implementation: The focus is on establishing strong governance institutions, enacting necessary legislation (such as the administrative, civil service, and electoral codes), and delivering services to the people of the Bangsamoro. This involves capacity building, ensuring transparency and accountability, and fostering inclusive governance.
Normalization Process: The decommissioning of MILF forces continues in phases, alongside efforts to transform MILF camps into peaceful and productive communities. Addressing the proliferation of firearms and integrating former combatants remain key priorities.
Addressing Islamic State (ISIS) influence: The presence of extremist groups, some claiming allegiance to ISIS, continues to pose a security threat in some parts of Mindanao. The BARMM government and the GRP are working together to counter this threat through security operations and community-based programs aimed at preventing radicalization. The MILF, now a partner in peace, is crucial in this effort, using its influence to counter extremist narratives.
Sustainable Peace: Achieving sustainable peace requires not only the successful implementation of the peace agreement but also addressing the underlying issues of poverty, lack of opportunities, and historical injustices. Economic development, investments in infrastructure and social services, and ensuring transitional justice are essential for long-term stability.

The History of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a testament to the enduring struggle for self-determination and the complex path towards peace. From its origins as a splinter group driven by ideological differences and a commitment to armed struggle, the MILF has evolved into a political entity leading the Bangsamoro towards genuine autonomy within the Philippine republic. The success of the BARMM and the long-term stability of Mindanao hinge on the continued commitment of all stakeholders – the GRP, the MILF, other Moro groups, and the people of the Bangsamoro – to the principles enshrined in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the ongoing peace process. The journey is far from over, but the establishment of the BARMM represents a historic opportunity to finally achieve lasting peace and development in a region long plagued by conflict.

Key Takeaways:

The MILF emerged from a split within the MNLF due to disagreements over strategy and ideology, led by Hashim Salamat.
The MILF’s struggle was rooted in the broader Moro conflict, driven by historical grievances and perceived marginalization of the Moro people in Mindanao.
The MILF became the dominant armed Moro group after the MNLF signed a peace deal with the Ramos administration.
Major conflicts, including the “all-out war” under the Estrada administration, highlighted the MILF’s resilience and the need for a political solution.
The peace process under the Aquino administration led to the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).
The Mamasapano clash posed a significant challenge to the peace process but did not derail it completely.
The Duterte administration oversaw the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
The MILF is currently leading the transition government in the BARMM, transitioning from an armed group to a governance partner.
Key challenges remain, including the completion of the normalization process, addressing security threats like Islamic State (ISIS) influence, and ensuring effective governance and development in the BARMM.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ):

Q1: What is the main difference between the MNLF and the MILF? A1: While both groups emerged from the Moro conflict and initially sought self-determination for the Moro people, the MILF split from the MNLF primarily due to ideological differences and disagreements over strategy following the Tripoli Agreement. The MILF, led by Hashim Salamat, had a more explicitly Islamic orientation and initially pursued outright separatism, although their goal later evolved towards genuine autonomy. The MNLF, under Nur Misuari, eventually signed a peace agreement accepting limited autonomy within the Philippine state framework.

Q2: What was the significance of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)? A2: The FAB and CAB, signed during the Aquino administration, are the landmark peace agreements between the GRP and the MILF. The FAB provided the roadmap, while the CAB consolidated all annexes and details, creating the blueprint for establishing the Bangsamoro political entity with enhanced autonomy to replace the ARMM. These agreements formed the basis for the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).

Q3: How did the Mamasapano clash impact the peace process? A3: The Mamasapano clash in January 2015, involving government forces and MILF elements, caused significant casualties and public outrage. It severely eroded trust, stalled the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) in Congress, and highlighted the fragility of the ceasefire and the complexities of security in conflict areas. Despite this major setback, both parties eventually recommitted to the peace process.

Q4: What is the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)? A4: The BARMM is the new autonomous political entity in southern Philippines, established in 2019 based on the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). It replaced the former ARMM and grants the Bangsamoro people significantly greater autonomy and control over their affairs, resources, and ancestral domain.

Q5: What is the MILF’s role in the BARMM today? A5: The MILF, through its political wing, leads the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the interim government of the BARMM. This signifies their transformation from an armed insurgency group to a partner in governance, tasked with establishing institutions, enacting laws, and delivering services as the region transitions towards its first regular elections.

Q6: What is the “normalization process” in the context of the MILF peace agreement? A6: The normalization process is a key component of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) that addresses the security aspect of the peace agreement. It includes the decommissioning of MILF forces and weapons, the transformation of MILF camps into peaceful communities, and socio-economic programs for former combatants and their communities. It aims to ensure a smooth transition from conflict to peace and development.

Q7: How has the MILF addressed the issue of Islamic State (ISIS) influence in Mindanao? A7: The MILF, now part of the BARMM government and committed to peace, actively works to counter extremist groups and ideologies, including those influenced by ISIS. They cooperate with the GRP on security matters and use their influence within communities to prevent radicalization and recruitment by these groups, viewing them as a threat to the peace process and the Bangsamoro.

Sources:

Genesis, J. (2019). The Bangsamoro Basic Law: Negotiating Peace in the Southern Philippines. Ateneo de Manila University Press. (Often cited for details on the BBL negotiation process)
Gutierrez, E., Parsa, A.F., & Rizal, J. (2009). Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Mindanao. Institute for Popular Democracy. (Provides background on the Moro conflict and various groups)
Jubilan, N. (2018). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Peace Process: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 8(1), 101-118. (Academic perspective on MILF’s engagement in peace talks)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). (Various years). Official Statements and Documents. (Primary source for MILF’s own perspective, though access can be limited).
Philippine Government Peace Negotiating Panel. (Various years). Official Reports and Documents on the GRP-MILF Peace Process. (Primary source from the government’s side).
The Asia Foundation. (Various reports). Conflict and Fragility in Mindanao. (Provides analysis and context on the ongoing dynamics in the region). [Example: https://www.google.com/search?q=https://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/philippines/program-areas/peace-stability/]
International Crisis Group. (Various reports). Philippines: Ending the Conflict in Mindanao. (Offers in-depth analysis and recommendations on the peace process and security situation). [Example: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines]
Rodis, R. (2014). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines: From Armed Struggle to Peace Process. In Islam and Politics in the Philippines (pp. 85-104). NUS Press. (Chapter providing an overview of MILF’s history and shift towards peace).
Salah Jubair (pseudonym, believed to be a senior MILF official). (Various writings). Articles and Books on the Moro Struggle. (Provides insight into MILF’s perspective, though requires critical evaluation).
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Laws and Issuances related to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). (Official government records). [Example: https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/section/laws/republic-acts/ra-11054/]
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (Various reports). Displacement in Mindanao. (Provides data and information on the humanitarian impact of the conflict). [Example: https://www.unhcr.org/ph/]. Note: Specific reports on displacement related to MILF conflicts might require searching their archive.

(Note: Specific links for all sources may require searching within the organizations’ websites or academic databases depending on availability and publication type.)

Category: Third Republic (1946-1972)